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ABSTRACT
Modern Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) feature wireless con-
nectivity, which makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Par-
ticular to IMDs is the battery Denial-of-Service attack whereby at-
tackers aim to fully deplete the battery by occupying the IMD with
continuous authentication requests. Zero-Power Defense (ZPD)
based on energy harvesting is known to be an excellent protection
against these attacks. This paper establishes essential design speci-
fications for employing ZPD techniques in IMDs, offers a critical
review of ZPD techniques found in literature and, subsequently,
gives crucial recommendations for developing comprehensive ZPD
solutions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Implantable medical devices (IMDs) such as cardiac pacemakers,
neurostimulators, infusion pumps and more, are autonomous de-
vices with extremely high dependability and safety constraints.
The typical operational lifetime of these battery-powered devices is
around a decade or so while implanted in the patient’s body. Almost
all of these devices are equipped with wireless connectivity via a
transceiver in order to support and complement their treatment ca-
pabilities [37]. They can communicate with an external reader (see
Figure 1) for e.g. monitoring patient health, updating IMD settings,
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Figure 1: A Reader/IMD system
and so on. However, despite their benefits, these communication
capabilities open the door for malicious entities to wirelessly con-
nect to the device in order to steal private patient data, achieve
mis-diagnosis, or even cause physical harm. An attacker can cause
physical harm either by changing the IMD functionality (e.g., by
managing to send incorrect commands) or through a Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attack. One such attack is the battery DoS where
the attacker can force the IMD to continuously run an energy-
consuming operation, which ultimately results in power loss and
IMD shutdown. As an example, he/she can repeatedly request the
IMD to establish a secure channel using incorrect credentials. Con-
sequently, the IMD will run part of an energy-consuming authenti-
cation protocol for analyzing every request, which will drain the
battery. As indicated in the IMD-threat-modeling analysis in [37],
battery DoS is one of the easiest to mount and highly effective
attacks. This is also backed by the majority of the IMD-specific-
ethical-hacking efforts in which the batteries of commercial IMDs
were depleted using black-box approaches [12, 25].
The only robust way of protecting an IMD against a battery DoS
is by running the above-mentioned (energy-consuming) authenti-
cation operation using only free harvested energy. It can be argued
that there is no necessity for this zero-power defense (ZPD) mech-
anism since technology exists to wirelessly charge IMD batteries
when they are running low (as discussed in Section 2). However,
this recharging feature is only available in less critical IMDs, such
as spinal-cord stimulators. For critical devices such as pacemak-
ers, there is a reluctance among the medical community to give
recharging responsibility to the patients, in order to avoid patient
errors. Moreover, the physicians prefer to replace the whole IMD
after a certain period to get the latest technology [19]. Besides, even
by assuming that all IMDs have this capability, the attacker can
still drain the battery before the patient or doctor has a chance to
recharge it.
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Energy harvesting is a widely used concept employed in a variety
of devices including RFIDs. However, ZPD for IMDs introduces new
challenges that do not apply in other domains. This paper is the first
to facilitate the transition from concept to practical ZPD designs for
IMDs. Based on a clear-cut set of design considerations, we survey
and evaluate the current state of the art and proceed to propose
specific recommendations for enhancing existing IMDs. Essentially,
this work makes the following novel contributions:
• We consolidate ZPD design considerations for the specific
domain of IMDs.
• We perform a survey of existing systems and highlight their
limitations based on the above considerations.
• We provide recommendations in order to develop compre-
hensive protection of IMDs against battery-DoS attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide brief
background on the use of energy harvesting in IMDs in Section 2,
and then provide motivation for using it to enhance IMD security
in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide detailed ZPD design consid-
erations. Based on these considerations, we review and evaluate
state-of-the-art ZPD solutions in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide
recommendations for improving ZPD designs. We conclude the
discussion in Section 7.
2 ENERGY HARVESTING IN IMDS
The use of energy harvesting in IMDs is not new. The application
of this concept, however, has been very narrow in this domain,
i.e., in wireless power transfer (WPT)1 to recharge IMD batter-
ies. For instance, there are several rechargeable neurostimulators
that are commercially available [1, 28]. In this specific category
of implants, there is a rising trend towards increased IMD-power
requirements due to recent advances in neuromodulation-related
pain relief. For such power-hungry devices, a non-rechargeable
battery would result in a very short IMD lifespan and subsequently
require expensive surgeries in order to replace the battery-depleted
implants. One way of avoiding this is to use larger battery sizes,
which can quickly become impractical to implant. Hence, the nat-
ural solution is to use rechargeable systems, which can prevent
the need for frequent surgeries and would result in smaller battery
sizes and implants as a whole [29].
3 ENERGY HARVESTING FOR IMD SECURITY
As indicated in Section 1, battery DoS is one of the easiest to mount
and highly effective attacks. In light of the fact that energy har-
vesting has already been employed by some classes of IMDs, the
use of this concept, in the form of ZPD, has now become quintes-
sential to protecting all IMDs against battery DoS. In this scheme,
the IMD, while authenticating the external entity that is trying to
communicate, can run the energy-consuming security primitives
using the RF energy harvested from the incoming communication
messages. The IMD is allowed to use the battery for subsequent
operations only after the entity is authenticated. This prevents the
IMD depleting its battery to entertain continuous bogus messages
from a malicious entity.
1The term energy harvesting generally refers to harvesting energy from ambient
sources, whereasWPT refers to the intentional transfer of energy from a dedicated
charging device [5]. In this paper, we use the terms interchangeably.
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Figure 2: A typical WPT System (RF Energy Harvesting)
Table 1: Comparison of WPT techniques
Technique Range Biological Transferred Receiver
effects power size
IPT − − + −
RFPT + − − +
APT −∗ + + +
+/−: relatively good/poor performance, ∗ : requires (non-air) medium
4 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
In this section, we enumerate and discuss various considerations
that should be taken into account when approaching the design of
an IMD-specific ZPD system.
4.1 Choice of WPT technique
Since ZPD is based on the concept of wireless energy harvesting, it
is important to briefly discuss the WPT techniques that enable such
strategies. A typical WPT setup is shown in Figure 2 [16, 23]. State-
of-the-art IMD-specific WPT techniques can be broadly categorized
into three types2 [2]:
4.1.1 Inductive Coupling (IC). Near-field WPT is usually catego-
rized as inductive coupling or inductive power transfer (IPT). IPT
usually involves the use of two coupled coils that have the same
inductance. The transmitter coil is placed outside the body. When
an AC current passes through it, voltage is induced due to elec-
tromagnetic induction in the receiver coil, which is located inside
the body. IPT is the dominant method that is used to wirelessly
recharge commercial IMDs, specifically neurostimulators [1, 28].
4.1.2 Radio Frequency (RF). If the transfer is in the transition re-
gion (mid field) [13] or far field then the WPT system is usually
categorized as RF power transfer (RFPT). Here, antennas are not
just limited to coils for the transmission of power. A typical RFPT
system is shown in Figure 2.
4.1.3 Acoustic/Ultrasound. This WPT category harvests acoustic
waves, which are usually from ultrasound frequencies. In acoustic
power transfer (APT), the transmitter node, while in contact with
the skin, generates these waves using a piezoelectric transducer.
These waves induce voltage on a piezoelectric device in the receiver
node, which is located inside the body along with the IMD.
2Note that this classification is not universal.
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The advantages and drawbacks of the three WPT techniques are
summarized in Table 1 in terms of operating range, potential bio-
logical effects, amount of transferred power and receiver area. The
choice of WPT scheme and associated transferred-power amount
has an impact on the real-time IMD performance, and also on the
size of the energy reservoir and, subsequently, the IMD as a whole.
This is further discussed in the subsequent sections.
4.2 Medical safety constraints
The ZPD technique should satisfy the various requirements by the
FDA, FCC, IEEE etc., in order to prevent any adverse biological
effects on human tissue due to excess electromagnetic-energy ex-
posure. IEEE puts constraints on the intensity of RF signals and
defines maximum-permissible-exposure (MPE) limits for magnetic
and electric fields [15]. In addition to RF-signal intensity, the signal
frequency has a significant impact on the amount of energy ab-
sorbed in the human tissue and the resulting potential to cause harm.
This absorption is characterized by specific absorption rate (SAR),
which is expressed in Wkд or
mW
kд . The peak-spatial-average SAR
values for exposure of the public and controlled environments are 2
W
kд and 10
W
kд , respectively (over 10 д of tissue) [15]. FDA also has
guidelines regarding intensity of acoustic signals in Wcm2 , namely
spatial peak temporal average intensity (ISPTA) and spatial peak
pulse average intensity (ISPPA) [10]. Satisfying these constraints
impacts the choice of WPT scheme (as discussed in Section 4.1).
4.3 Frequency-band constraints
Certain FCC constraints also need to be met in order to avoid inter-
ference with the devices operating in the same frequency band. For
example, the MedRadio band, which is reserved for IMD communi-
cation, does not allow an equivalent isotropically radiated power
(EIRP) of more than 25 µW [9]. Since this amount of power is unre-
alistic for WPT, a separate band should be used for power transfer,
whereas the MedRadio band can be used for data communication.
This implies increased cost and size due to the use of two antennas.
One solution could be to use a single ISM-band (13.56 MHz) an-
tenna for both WPT and data communication, however this would
result in lower data rates due to smaller allowed bandwidth than
that of MedRadio [26].
4.4 Harvested vs. Consumed power
Harvested energy needs to stay above the consumed power in order
for the energy consumers to work seamlessly. Otherwise, an energy
reservoir should be employed so that it can collect sufficient energy
before the IMD can use it. Technically, due to this reservoir, the
ZPD scheme should always work, but the charging delay limits
usability and real-time behavior, which can be critical in the case
of emergencies.
4.5 Choice of energy reservoir
Either a supercapacitor (supercap) or a rechargeable battery can
be employed as the energy reservoir. Supercaps in general have a
longer lifespan and support more recharge cycles than batteries [24],
and thus are more suitable for IMDs. The supercap, if used, could
limit the range of applied charging voltage, since these components
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Figure 3: Classification of passive communication devices in
terms of transmitter implementation
have low operating-voltage limits. Also, as indicated by [17], the
capacitor size has to incorporate the losses due to the decoupling
capacitors connected to the energy consumers.
4.6 Passive wireless communication
Passive communication relies on WPT schemes in order to function
without the need of an on-board battery. This concept forms the
basis of ZPD strategies, which will be discussed in Section 5. The
most critical component of these passive devices is the wireless
transceiver that can cause significant peak power consumption
based on the design choice. Based on the choice of transmitter,
which subsequently impacts the receiver implementation, we cat-
egorize these devices into four schemes, as depicted in Figure 3.
The different schemes at the leaf nodes are numbered accordingly
and are subsequently explained. The first part of the scheme name
indicates the type of wireless communication whereas the suffix
indicates whether the communication shares the power-transfer-
signal frequency band (PB) or uses an independent band (IB).
4.6.1 ActiveTX-IB. The passive device has an active transceiver,
i.e., it actively transmits (using supply from the energy reservoir)
instead of reflecting the incident RF signal, as shown in Figure 4a.
This scheme is employed by the design in [36].
4.6.2 IC-PB. The forward direction (reader to passive device) com-
munication uses the same signal that is used for inductive power
transfer, which lies in the low- or high-frequency band (LF-HF). For
the reverse direction, the electrical properties of the inductive coil
are changed (by load modulation, in this case Load Shift Keying),
which affects the same inductive coupling field, and is thus detected
by the reader (see Figure 4b). The design in [3] employs this scheme.
4.6.3 EMB-PB. Compared to the previous scheme, RF/Electro-
magnetic backscattering (EMB), which reflects the incident RF,
is used for data transmission instead of inductive coupling. Here,
the incident RF is used for both energy harvesting and data com-
munication (see Figure 4b). The RF is reflected if the load across the
antenna feed-point is minimum, and vice versa. One of the works
that employ this scheme is [35]. The use of EMB helps eliminate
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Figure 4: Schematics of different passive communication
schemes for ZPD
the high peak power consumption of a conventional RF transmitter.
This is important for passive devices because even to transmit just
a few bits of data, the peak power may exceed the incoming power,
which will result in device malfunction in the absence of a reservoir.
Note that the use of EMB for transmission is fully beneficial only if
a simple and low-power circuit is used for the receive path, such as
an Amplitude-Shift-Keying (ASK) envelop detection.
4.6.4 EMB-IB. Compared to EMB-PB, here the difference is that
the WPT signal is different than the one used for EMB (as shown
in Figure 4c). The design in [23] uses this scheme.
ActiveTX-IB and EMB-IB offer the most flexibility since they use
separate antennas for WPT and data communication. As discussed
in Section 4.3, these configurations are helpful in meeting the FCC
constraints while maintaining both the sufficient power transfer
and data rates. On the other hand, IC-PB and EMB-PB are more
economical in terms of resources since they only employ one an-
tenna [26]. This is, however, at the cost of reduced flexibility in
terms of data rate.
4.7 Fundamental security services
ZPD schemes primarily address Availability from the CIANA se-
curity services [37]: Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, Non-
repudiation and Availability. Ensuring the first four services can
have an indirect impact on Availability. As an example, if the IMD
has a dedicated processor that is responsible for authenticating an
external entity, the peak-power consumption of the implant will
increase when this peripheral is active. As a result, the bogus mes-
sages sent by an attacker will draw more energy from the battery
than in the case of a less-secure IMD. Hence, ensuring one service
should not be at the expense of the other.
The choice of cryptographic primitives, which are needed to
provide these services, plays a critical role in the design of the
energy-harvesting circuit. For example, lightweight block ciphers
are preferred candidates for achieving data confidentiality because
of their low energy profile. Moreover, in order to achieve integrity
and authentication, a cipher-based Message Authentication Code
(MAC) should be used instead of a hash-based MAC (HMAC) be-
cause of lower energy consumption in software implementations.
For dedicated hardware implementations, however, this does not
always hold [32]. Furthermore, for these systems mutual authenti-
cation should be employed instead of just authenticating the reader
unilaterally. This is required to prevent spoofing attacks on the
reader [38]. This implies that the harvested energy should be able
to support both transmission and reception of data.
4.8 Emergency access
In the case of emergencies, the paramedics or first responders
should have seamless and fast access to the IMD, without compro-
mising patient safety and security. Hence, an appropriate balance
should be attained between usability, safety and security. It is of
paramount importance that the choice of WPT and the associated
energy reservoir results in acceptable charging delay in order to
ensure real-time performance. Otherwise, it will block legitimate
access to the IMD in emergency scenarios.
4.9 Design suitability
Existing IMD designs take a long time from concept to market due
to pedantic regulatory hurdles. Therefore, any new ZPD solution
should fit in seamlessly in the existing designs resulting in minimal
changes and short review cycles. For example, as mentioned in
Section 4.4, technically-speaking a large energy reservoir should
always work but this increases the size of the ZPD solution and
introduces unnecessary delay, which impacts suitability.
4.10 Conformity to touch-to-access principle
Any ZPD scheme shall ensure that only the entity in close proximity
to the patient for a prolonged period of time is allowed to access
the IMD. This touch-to-access principle assumes that it is infeasible
for the attacker to get in close proximity since the patient would
reject physical contact with untrusted entities [34, 37].
4.11 Range of operation
The ZPD solution shall be able to work correctly independently
of the implantation depth. Appropriate balance should be attained
between the WPT and the associated thermal effects and energy ab-
sorption in the human tissue. Also, the ZPD solution shall allow the
provision of a bedside-base-station operation for the convenience
of the patient (see Figure 1). This device by definition can be less
than 10 feet away from the patient [27]. However, in order to con-
form to the touch-to-access principle, this communication should
be strictly limited to the bedside range (less than 5 feet away).
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Table 2: Summary of ZPD strategies
Technique Halperin et al. [12] Liu et al. [22] Strydis et al. [38] Ellouze et al. [6, 7] Yang et al. [40] Chang et al. [3]
Satisfy safety constraints - - - - - -
Satisfy freq. band constraints - Yes - Yes Yes -
Harvested vs. consumed power - - - - - -
Real-time performance Yes - - - - Yes
Energy reservoir Not used Not used - Not used Not used -
Type of WPT technique RFPT RFPT (ISM) - RFPT IPT IPT
Passive wireless communication:
Scheme EMB-PB - - EMB-PB IC-PB IC-PB
ZPD Receive path ASK - - ASK IC (ASK) IC (FM)
ZPD Transmit path EMB No - EMB IC (ASK) IC (ASK)
Security services related:
Employed primitives DE (RC5) - DE, CMAC (MISTY1) DE, HMAC Hash function AES-CCM-128
Mutual authentication No No Yes Yes Yes -
Avoids pre-shared keys Yes (using audio channel) No No Yes No -
Documented vulnerabilities [11] - - [33] - -
Emergency access Yes No No Yes No -
Touch-to-access Yes - No Yes - Yes
Operating distance:
Max. implantation depth 1 cm (animal tissue) - - - - 2.5 cm (air)
Bedside-base-station operation No No No No No No
Design suitability (size, WISP and RFID module Security co-processor WISP - -
additional hardware etc.) piezoelectric transducer
‘-’: Lacking information, DE: Data Encryption, Not used: Advantageous avoidance of an additional component, Yes/No: Satisfies requirement (or not)
5 A SURVEY OF EXISTING ZPD TECHNIQUES
In light of the design considerations mentioned in Section 4, we
now survey works from literature and discuss their limitations.
We hope that this survey will help us construct more complete
solutions. These works are presented in chronological order, which,
to the best of our knowledge, are the only works pertaining to ZPD
for IMDs.
Halperin et al. [12] presented the pioneering work of RFID-
style energy harvesting for zero-power defense of IMDs. They
use an RFID module called WISP [35], which employs EMB for the
data transmission from the implant to the reader, and simple ASK-
envelop detection in the reverse direction, while using RFPT for
wireless power transfer. Their scheme, however, does not perform
mutual authentication and its acoustic-communication-based key
transport is susceptible to attack, as shown in [11].
The scheme from Liu et al. [22] is the only ZPD work that takes
FCC regulations into consideration. They employ the ISM band for
RFPT and the MedRadio band for data communication. It employs
a dedicated passive RFID wake-up module, which performs RF-
energy harvesting from the incoming signal in order to authenticate
the other entity. Upon successful authentication, the main module
is woken up. This scheme uses pre-shared keys between the reader
and the IMD, which makes emergency access impossible. This is
because in emergencies, the IMD and the paramedic reader are
likely unknown to each other and therefore do not share a key.
Strydis et al. [38] propose an IMD architecture that isolates the
implant functionality from the security tasks by using dedicated
processing cores for the respective applications. They designed
the security co-processor from scratch, which was optimized for
executing the MISTY1 cipher in terms of energy and performance.
The choice of this dual-core architecture helps in dealing with re-
peated communication requests that may prevent the implant from
performing its primary task. Battery DoS is tackled by ensuring
that the security core and the transceiver run on harvested RF en-
ergy before mutual authentication of reader/IMD. After successful
authentication, these modules are allowed to use battery power for
subsequent communication. However, they did not present a full
system implementation.
Ellouze et al. [6, 7] propose an RFID-based, energy-harvesting
solution, that uses the same WISP module as employed by [12].
In contrast to [12], their solution additionally provides mutual
authentication. They use cardiac-signal-based biometrics for au-
thentication and the generation of session keys. However, the fuzzy-
vault-inspired protocol (OPFKA) [14] employed in their scheme is
vulnerable to attacks as demonstrated in [33].
Yang et al. [40] use IPT, and employ the same coil for power
transfer and data communication. Their scheme provides mutual
authentication. However, it employs pre-shared keys, and is thus
unable to support emergency access. Moreover, they did not imple-
ment a unified ZPD-system since the hash-based authentication
was verified separately on an FPGA.
Chang et al. [3] propose a generic ZPD solution that is not spe-
cific to IMDs per se, however, it covers a spectrum of devices that
have more or less the same profile. They propose IPT for the power
transfer from the reader. This signal is also used for bi-directional
communication. However, they do not give any description of the
employed security protocol.
Table 2 compares the above ZPD techniques based on the various
parameters and design considerations highlighted in Section 4.
We can see that all listed works lack the evaluation of hazardous
biological effects of the employed WPT schemes. They also do
not consider the possibility of a bedside-base-station operation,
which is a rising trend in the reader/IMD systems. Moreover, all the
techniques offer insufficient security-services and/or have security
vulnerabilities in one form or another.
6 RECOMMENDATIONS
We, next, provide recommendations on how existing solutions can
be improved in order to better meet the design constraints high-
lighted in Section 4.
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6.1 Adaptive ZPD
In modern IMD setups, in addition to the doctor’s programmer,
we also have a bedside base-station, as shown in Figure 1. For the
convenience of the patients, these wireless devices are required
to communicate with the IMD from a few feet away [27]. With
this constraint, IPT- and APT-based ZPD cannot be used for the
base-station/IMD authentication. Hence, with this setup, it is ad-
vantageous to employ RFPT for energy harvesting, since they are
more flexible compared to IPT and APT in terms of range. Though
the amount of power transferred through RFPT is significantly
small compared to IPT/APT, it is not an issue in this specific case
since the base-station communication is only used for non-critical
daily monitoring. As a result, this setup can afford long delays due
to energy-reservoir charging. In light of the above, an adaptive
ZPD approach should be considered, that e.g., uses IPT/APT for
doctor-programmer/IMD communication, and switches to RFPT
for base-station/IMD communication. In terms of implementation
cost, it is more economical to use IPT for programmer/IMD commu-
nication instead of APT. This is because same coils can potentially
be employed for near-field (programmer communication) and far-
field (base-station communication). On the other hand, the use of
APT (for programmer communication) would require the use of
piezoelectric transducers in addition to the RF antenna (needed for
base-station communication).
6.2 Main-implant-battery size
We now discuss how realistic it is to achieve battery DoS when
considering actual IMD battery sizes. The IMD-battery-lifetime
Energy Harvester
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Transceiver etc.
VOUT
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PCH
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Figure 7: Simple ZPD configuration
trends with respect to example processor duty cycles are shown in
Figure 5. For instance, the pacemaker design in [21] has a processor
duty cycle of 5%. For the calculations, it is assumed that the IMD
has a state-of-the-art ultra-low-power ARM Cortex-M0+ based 32-
bit MCU [18], running at 19MHz, and an implantable-grade radio
transceiver [30], with an effective data rate of 265 kbps . The duty
cycle of the transceiver is assumed to be 0.21%, which corresponds to
3 minutes of active data communication per 24 hours with a bedside
base-station [27]. The data points correspond to actual implantable-
grade battery sizes [39]. The time required to completely deplete
the IMD battery through battery DoS is illustrated in Figure 6. On
average, we assume half the charge available in the batteries due
to normal use. We also assume that the authentication steps are
executed on active modes of the MCU and the transceiver with the
current consumption of 0.78mA and 4.9mA, respectively. It can
be deduced from these plots that, as a first layer of defense, the
battery sizes for critical applications, such as pacemakers, should
be as large as possible.
6.3 Reservoir size and charging delay
If the peak power of the load is always less than the harvested power
then we do not need a reservoir. Otherwise, the size of the reservoir
is determined by looking at the required energy consumption of all
the consumers during the authentication operation. Moreover, if a
reservoir is required, then it may seem that any ZPD scheme might
work. However, this is not true since it can become impractical for
high-energy-consumption solutions due to the long delay, which is
required to store sufficient energy.
For capacitor reservoirs, in order to determine the required ca-
pacitance, the energy available in the capacitor (Ecap ), should be
greater than the authentication energy (Eauth ). The capacitance
can be calculated using (1) [4], whereVmax is the capacitor voltage
when it is sufficiently charged and Vmin is when it has been used
by the application or authentication process (see Figure 7).
Ecap =
1
2 C (V
2
max −V 2min ) > Eauth (1)
RF-energy harvesters in general output constant power instead
of constant voltage [31]. In this type of capacitor charging, the
supplied voltage increases (instead of staying fixed) and current
decreases with increasing capacitor voltage. The capacitor charging
time3 (tch ) for this type of charging is calculated using (2) [31].
Here, Pch is the charging power supplied by the energy harvester
to the capacitor (C), R is the capacitor’s equivalent series resistance
(ESR) and Q is the amount of coulombs stored during this time.
Here A =
√
Q2 + 4C2RPch .
3The capacitor charging time for constant voltage charging is 5RC .
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Figure 8: Supercapacitor characteristics in relation to appli-
cation duty cycle (active mode vs. sleep mode)
tch =
Q2 +QA + 4C2RPch ln( A+Q√4C2RPch )
4CPch
(2)
If the authentication-energy consumption is reduced then the
required reservoir capacitance can be reduced as result. If this
value is within 0.1 µF to 470 µF , then ceramic capacitors can be
employed, which are ideal for energy harvesting because of low
leakage current, small size and low cost [4]. These capacitors also
have a very low ESR [8], which allows us to ignore the effect of the
time constant (RC). Hence, (2) can be simplified as (3), which is also
equivalent to (4). Here, E is the energy stored in the capacitor.
tch =
Q2
2CPch
(3)
tch =
E
Pch
(4)
The time it takes to charge an empty capacitor (tchinit ial ), and
in the case of subsequent charging operations (tchr epeat ) when a
capacitor has a residue voltage of Vmin can be calculated by (5) [4].
Here, Einit ial = 12CV
2
max , which is the energy attained by an empty
capacitor when charged from 0 V to Vmax .
tchinit ial =
Einit ial
Pch
tchr epeat =
Ecap
Pch
(5)
As an example, we use the evaluation setup from Section 6.2
and take the ISO/IEC 9798-2 based mutual authentication protocol
from the ZPD solution in [38]. We use AES-128 for data confiden-
tiality and cipher-based MAC. For WPT, we look at the IPT scheme
from [20], which is specifically designed for IMDs and delivers
Pch = 6.15mW . Using Vmax = 3.3 V and Vmin = 2.1 V , which are
within the operating supply voltage range of this setup (i.e., 2.05 V
to 3.5V ), we see thatC for the resulting scheme turns out to be 6.19
µF (since the required Eauth = 20.07 µJ ). Using a standard ceramic
capacitance of size greater than this value e.g., 10 µF , tchinit ial and
tchr epeat turn out to be 8.85ms and 5.27ms respectively, which are
quite reasonable in terms of real-time behavior.
In general, the simplest solution is always to choose a reservoir
capacitance that is much larger than the required value (as long as
the charging delay is reasonable). This margin is important since the
authentication protocol or the employed cryptographic primitives
can change in the future, e.g., due to security updates. However,
in case C turns out to be outside the ceramic-capacitor range due
to large Eauth , we can employ the following schemes to reduce it,
and the charging delay.
6.3.1 Use of sleep modes. The capacitor-charging delay can be
minimized by using sleep modes and interrupts, instead of sizing
the capacitor for the whole authentication, resulting in reduced
required capacitance. One way of achieving this could be to achieve
a minimum required voltage (VTHRH ) using a voltage-controlled
switch, before the capacitor energy is used by the rest of the IMD
(Figure 8a). After some processing, the implant MCU can then enter
sleep mode based on a voltage-comparator-based interrupt when
the capacitor voltage (VC ) falls below a lower threshold (VTHRL ).
Subsequently, theMCU canwakeup4 again if another such interrupt
is set at VC > VTHRH [17]. In this case, a protocol step, such as a
MAC calculation, can have multiple processing steps. Another way
could be to go to sleep after each protocol step in order to reduce the
number of wakeups and the associated delay at the cost of a larger
capacitor. Here, the protocol step is the same as the processing step
(Figure 8b). In this case, the supercap size should be chosen based
on the most energy-consuming protocol step. However, this can
be problematic if such a step is changed in the future due to the
reprogramming of the IMD with a different authentication protocol.
Note that in this scheme as well the comparator interrupt will be
required to wake up the device, indicating that the capacitor has
been sufficiently charged.
6.3.2 Gradual switch to harvested energy. In another approach, the
implant can use the battery for the first authentication request and
if it fails, it can switch to harvested energy for subsequent accesses
within a specified time-frame. This can allow for smaller reser-
voir sizes since we can afford the resulting delay due to frequent
charge/discharge cycles in case of an inauthentic entity.
6.4 Timeouts
It can be argued that timeouts can be employed as a simpler al-
ternative to ZPD. For instance, after a certain number of incorrect
attempts, the IMD can be made to not accept further messages
for a certain duration. For domains other than IMDs this can be a
natural choice. However, for IMDs, these timeouts can significantly
4These plots do not show the wakeup-time durations for clarity.
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compromise patient safety. For instance, any timeout after a mali-
cious access can subsequently block a valid authentication attempt,
which impacts availability.
7 CONCLUSION
Over the last few years, energy harvesting has been touted as a
solution for protecting IMDs against battery-DoS. In this paper, we
have provided an extensive review of the IMD-specific ZPD works
from literature. We analyzed these works based on our formulated
design considerations, and highlighted their shortcomings. This
paper is the first to substantiate these considerations and to provide
specific recommendations towards practical ZPD implementations.
One strong recommendation is to employ adaptive ZPD in order to
facilitate bedside-base-station operation. As future work, we intend
to develop a comprehensive ZPD scheme, which incorporates the
lessons learned from this work.
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